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,,QWURGXFWLRQ
At the Informal Ecofin of 11 September 1999 in Turku, ministers and governors agreed to
ask the Economic and Financial Committee to check whether the existing regulatory and
supervisory structures in the EU can safeguard financial stability, particularly in the context
of a rapidly changing financial environment. For this purpose, an ad hoc working group,
chaired by the Dutch Deputy Governor Henk Brouwer prepared this report on financial
stability under the aegis of the EFC. The organisation of the report is as follows. Section II
contains the main conclusions (DVVHVVPHQWThe rest of the paper examines the impact of
the major financial trends on the stability of the financial system in Europe (section III), as
well as the arrangements in the EU aimed at safeguarding financial stability. These
arrangements can be divided into two main groups: the first one covers regulations (section
IV) and supervisory structures (section V), which are primarily directed at SUHYHQWLQJ
financial instability. The second group of arrangements consists of various types of FULVLV
PDQDJHPHQW, such as liquidity support to individual institutions or to the market as a whole
(section VI).
,,$VVHVVPHQW
,,)LQDQFLDOGHYHORSPHQWV
The report has examined the influence of ongoing financial trends on the existing regulatory
and supervisory structures aimed at safeguarding financial stability in Europe. The common
element of the financial trends discussed is that the linkages between financial markets and
financial institutions, both across-borders and across-sectors, are intensifying. The
development of deeper, more liquid and more diverse financial markets contributes to
financial stability. At the same time, increasing integration and linkages of financial markets
can facilitate the transmission of risks and enhance contagion effects. Furthermore, it may
be noted that banks, which still play a pivotal role from a financial stability viewpoint in all
European countries, are increasingly influenced by developments on capital markets.
However, the process of intensifying linkages is not proceeding at the same pace in all
European countries. In addition, the financial trends discussed do not stop at the borders of
Europe, as for example the internationalisation of the activities of large European banks
involves both non-European and European countries. Consequently, the process of
intensifying linkages between and among financial markets and institutions is not
particularly a European, but a worldwide phenomenon.5
The introduction of the euro has further intensified the linkages between financial markets.
An integrated euro money market has emerged and the euro securities markets are deeper
and more liquid than those previously existing in the participating countries. Furthermore,
the fact that exchange rate movements cannot occur anymore within the euro area also
contributes to the overall stability of European financial markets. The establishment of a pan
European payment system (TARGET) overseen by the ESCB has been a favourable
development in this respect. On the other hand, contagion risks may have increased, since a
problem in one segment of the euro-area can have repercussions on the euro area-wide
market and beyond. In this respect, it is noteworthy that Euro-denominated markets have
developed in non-participating as well as participating countries.
As a result of the introduction of the euro the geographical domain of monetary policy and
that of prudential supervision do not coincide anymore. Monetary policy is now conducted
at the euro area level, whereas supervision on individual financial institutions and markets
has remained the responsibility of national authorities. When there is a major disruption in
financial markets, the Eurosystem could make use of its monetary instruments if this is
deemed necessary to safeguard financial stability, the smooth functioning of the payment
system, or the primary objective of price stability. On the other hand, the national authorities
will decide on how to deal with financial difficulties of individual institutions. This is
consistent with the responsibility of national authorities, including finance ministries, for
operations that may place taxpayers’ money at risk. Although financial instability may arise
from either market disruption or failing institutions, these sources often coincide in practice.
In particular, problems at a large financial institution might have contagion effects on other
financial institutions and thereby on the financial system as a whole, and vice versa. It is
crucial, therefore, that the national authorities and the ESCB exchange information and co-
operate smoothly.
,,,QVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVDQGWKHLUSUDFWLFDOIXQFWLRQLQJ
With respect to safeguarding financial stability in Europe, it is useful to make a distinction
between LQVWLWXWLRQDO arrangements on the one hand and the ways in which they are put into
SUDFWLFH on the other hand. The institutional arrangements are based on a framework of
legally binding, harmonised directives which are founded upon the principle of mutual
recognition of national regulations. This combination creates a single market, in which6
financial institutions are supervised by national ‘home country’ supervisory authorities. The
relevant directives are adapted to the changing financial environment on the basis of
proposals developed by the Commission in co-operation with various cross-border and
cross-sector committees, such as the BAC and its counterparts in insurance and securities
regulation (the IC and the HLSSC). In this process, the EU ministers of finance, represented
in the Ecofin, are jointly responsible for approving the directives, while they are
individually responsible – and thus accountable vis-à-vis their national parliaments - for
keeping European directives and national regulations in line with each other.
The practical functioning of the institutional framework is firstly constituted by Memoranda
of Understanding (MOUs). In particular, MOUs serve to specify the bilateral cross-border
co-operation between sectoral supervisors that is obliged in the context of ‘home country
control’ and ‘consolidated supervision’. Where large cross-border financial institutions have
emerged, cross-sector MOUs have been signed to provide clarity on the supervisor(s)
responsible for consolidated supervision. Incidentally, it appears from a survey conducted
by the working group that the information exchange and co-operation through MOUs is
more elaborate in the banking sector than in the insurance sector.
Secondly, several groups have been established to exchange information and to strengthen
the co-operation among supervisors, and between supervisors and national central banks.
With regard to banking supervision, the relevant committees are the Groupe de Contact and
the Banking Supervision Committee (BSC). The Groupe de Contact is a forum of
supervisory experts for the exchange of views on individual institutions and market
developments, and the assessment of trends in the banking sector. The BSC has a double
mandate from the Governing Council, i.e. (1) to assist the ESCB in contributing to the
measures undertaken by the competent authorities in the field of prudential supervision of
credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, and (2) to provide a multilateral
forum for the exchange of information and co-operation between banking supervisors of
different Member States.
The establishment of the ESCB has improved the ability to co-operate, as national central
banks that are part of this system are either formally responsible for, or closely involved in,
banking supervision. When central bank actions are needed to stabilise financial markets,
such as the handling of payment system problems or liquidity shortages in the market, the7
ESCB has the instruments to react promptly, under the condition that the primary objective
of price stability is not jeopardised.
Several other instruments can be deployed to limit potential contagion effects of financial
difficulties at individual institutions. In these circumstances, the national supervisory
authorities may orchestrate private sector solutions such as organising take-overs. Also,
clear mechanisms and allocation of responsibilities have been established within the ESCB
for providing liquidity support to solvent institutions. In extreme cases, national authorities
may have to provide public money to troubled institutions.
,,5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV
The existing LQVWLWXWLRQDO arrangements provide a coherent and flexible basis for
safeguarding financial stability in Europe. No institutional changes are deemed necessary.
However, the work underway in the context of the Commission’s Action Plan for Financial
Services deserves strong support. In particular, it is recommended that EU legislation
containing prudential rules for cross-sector groups (i.e. financial conglomerates) be drawn
up. In addition, the Commission’s request to the Lisbon European Council that an
agreement be reached on the proposed directives on the winding-up and liquidation of banks
and insurance companies respectively.
As for the SUDFWLFDO IXQFWLRQLQJ of the institutional arrangements, they do need some
enhancement. In order to adapt the practical arrangements further to the prevailing trends in
the financial sector, the following policy measures are recommended:
-  Strengthening the cross-sector co-operation at the international level, since the
present supervisory arrangements are primarily designed to enhance cross-border co-
operation. Within the EU, an important development is that the EU Commission has
facilitated a round table discussion among the chairs of the supervisory committees
of the different disciplines. International cross-sector co-operation could be further
improved  by clarifying and extending the concept of the co-ordinating supervisor(s)
for the large financial groups domiciled in Europe.
-  Making the exchange of information among different supervisory authorities, and
between supervisory authorities and central banks, on the major financial institutions8
and market trends a key feature of the strengthened co-operation between the
authorities involved. In this respect, the BSC and the Groupe de Contact can be
expected to work in close collaboration. Furthermore, it is important that the
ministries of finance and supervisory authorities regularly exchange views on the
adequacy and necessary adjustments of financial regulation in a national context as
well as in the context of the BAC, the IC and the HLSSC.
-  Strengthening the co-operation between supervisors and central banks, with a view
to ensure that if the emergence of financial problems at a major group may have
contagion effects in other EU-countries, this is reported to the relevant authorities of
the countries concerned.
-  Working on the convergence of supervisory practices, which can significantly
enhance the efficiency of the national supervisory authorities involved in monitoring
cross-border financial institutions.
Finally, the working group is of the opinion that future development should be kept under
review and that the ministers should be informed by the EFC about these developments on a
regular basis.
,,,)LQDQFLDOWUHQGV
,,,,QWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ
Mainly as a result of improvements in information technology and deregulation, world
financial institutions and markets are experiencing many changes, which could have
significant implications for the stability of the financial system. Both information
technology and deregulation can be regarded as underlying forces of several developments
in the financial system. A trend that is particularly relevant in the context of this report
concerns LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ, as it may result in overlapping responsibilities of different
supervisory authorities. Advances in information technology have lowered the costs of
communication, making an international network more practical, while at the same time
deregulation has opened up new markets. These factors have facilitated the process of
internationalisation, which may have gone further in some regions than in other ones.9
Assessing the degree of internationalisation is a difficult task, and the measures used in the
literature should be interpreted with caution. The SUROLIHUDWLRQRIHVWDEOLVKPHQWV of foreign
credit institutions is a traditional measure for the degree of cross border activity. The market
share of foreign branches and subsidiaries established by credit institutions domiciled in
other EU countries is currently relatively small, with the exception of Belgium, Ireland and
Luxembourg. Establishments of credit institutions outside the EU account for an even
smaller portion of activity. &URVVERUGHUPHUJHUVDQGDFTXLVLWLRQV – another measure of
penetration in foreign markets – have thus far not taken place in the EU on a large scale (see
also section III.3), although there exist some regional differences. The JHRJUDSKLFDO
GLVWULEXWLRQRIEDQNV¶ HDUQLQJV sheds a different light on the degree of internationalisation.
This indicator is somewhat broader than the previous ones, since, for example, off-balance-
sheet activities are taken into account. It follows that a substantial part of the earnings of the
ODUJHVW European banks come from abroad (see graph 1)
 1.
6RXUFH: Annual reports of individual credit institutions that are part of the Europe top 50 of
The Banker, based on total assets end 1998
More than half of this foreign income is earned in countries outside the EU. For the purpose
of evaluating the risks for cross border contagion it is, however, also relevant to investigate
                                                     
1 In general, income consists of the following items: interest income, income from shares, commission income,
profit from financial transactions and other operating income
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2  BIS-data indicate that the international interbank claims of
EU banks, measured as a percentage of total assets, have grown markedly from 1985
onwards (see graph 2). Furthermore, the links between banks of the EU have also become
stronger. (For example, in the fourth quarter of 1998 international claims from banks located
in the EU, on banks located outside the EU, cover 7 per cent of the balance sheet total of the
EU banking system. International claims from banks located in the EU, on banks located in
the EU, cover 12 per cent of the balance sheet total of the EU banking system.)
6RXUFH: BIS Databank (block M), International Banking Statistics. For Greece and Portugal no data
were available in the BIS Databank. Balance sheet totals are taken from the OECD Banking
Profitability and are dated end 1997.
These measures point to the conclusion that in nearly all EU-countries the bulk of traditional
activity still maintains a predominantly national dimension, and that the repercussions of
failures would therefore be mainly felt by domestic counterparts. However, the international
interbank claims of EU banks have gained in importance, and particularly the largest banks
in Europe appear to be increasingly exposed to shocks originating beyond national borders,
which potentially adds to systemic risk.
,,,,QWURGXFWLRQRIWKHHXUR
Before discussing other trends, it is important to make a distinction between the countries
that make up the EU and the ones of the euro-area. In the EU, the establishment of the
                                                     
2 Claims on banks = total assets -/- non-bank assets
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harmonised regulatory framework and the liberalisation of capital markets provided the
basis for a single market for financial services. As a result of the introduction of the euro the
geographical domain of monetary policy and that of prudential supervision do not coincide
anymore: monetary policy is now conducted at the euro area level, whereas supervision on
individual financial institutions has remained the responsibility of national authorities. As
far as ESCB monetary policy operations are concerned it is important to note that the
general eligibility criteria for counterparty status are uniform throughout the euro area, and
that the ECB may reject or restrict counterparties’ access to monetary policy instruments
and/or to the payment system TARGET on grounds of prudence. It is also of relevance that
the assets used as collateral have to fulfil certain criteria in order to be eligible for ESCB
monetary policy operations.
An integrated money market has emerged in the euro area, and the merger of national large
value payment systems within TARGET has facilitated the redistribution of liquidity across
the borders. As far as capital markets are concerned, the effects of the euro are also
substantial, as euro securities markets are deeper and more liquid than those previously in
the participating countries. Furthermore, the fact that exchange rate movements and related
movements in interest rates can not occur anymore within the euro-area has contributed
significantly to the overall stability of European financial markets. On the other hand,
contagion risks have potentially increased, because a problem in one segment within the
euro-area can be expected to have repercussions on the euro area-wide market. Furthermore,
in the medium and long run, the euro could act as a catalyst to reinforce prevailing trends
such as internationalisation, as well as other trends that are discussed below.
,,,2WKHUWUHQGVDQGFKDQJHV
Technological progress and deregulation have resulted in many QHZILQDQFLDOSURGXFWV that
allow the various risks which are implicit in a financial product to be unbundled and traded
separately. In this context, the strong growth in derivatives should be mentioned. In general,
this development has contributed to the efficiency of global financial markets, as derivatives
may allow for a reallocation of risks. The growth of derivatives has also created
opportunities to increase leverage for certain institutions in the financial sector, such as
hedge funds. Many changes in financial markets, most notably the rapidly increasing supply
of financial services through the Internet, may result in enhanced competition at the national
and international level both between banks and other institutions. These changes could12
increase the vulnerabilities of individual firms, as well as the risk of contagion between
market participants that are leveraged in the same way, and the systemic risks in general. A
related trend is GLVLQWHUPHGLDWLRQ. Against the background of deregulated capital markets,
which are becoming more transparent and liquid, firms raise capital directly in the market
instead of obtaining loans from banks. In practice, banks are not playing a less important
role in the financial sector, but they focus nowadays increasingly on other activities, such as
investment banking, trade in securities and derivatives, leasing, and other off-balance
activities. As a consequence, the current financial system, which used to be essentially
bank-based, is gradually shifting to a more market based system. As banks’ assets have
become more liquid and marketable, one implication could be that the likelihood of liquidity
problems is reduced. On the other hand, banks’ exposures to changes in market
developments could also be higher, making market reactions an important channel for
spreading financial problems.
As many other banking systems, a trend towards FRQVROLGDWLRQ characterises the European
banking sector in recent years. Until now, most mergers and acquisitions have taken place
within the national borders, although cross-border consolidation is gaining importance. An
example is the recently announced merger of MeritaNordbanken, which operates in Sweden
and in Finland, with Unidanmark, which operates in Denmark but has an insurance
subsidiary in Norway. The trend towards consolidation has several implications for financial
stability. Efforts to improve product and geographical diversification could make banks
more resistant to local or national business cycles, adding to financial stability. These
diversification gains can, however, to some degree be neutralised by increasing operational
risks that may arise as a result of consolidation practices. In addition, consolidation may
lead to more financial institutions whose failure could a pose systemic risk to the financial
system. The problem of moral hazard (“too big to fail”) could therefore also increase. A
related issue concerns the possible effects of consolidation on FRPSHWLWLRQ. As consolidation
will reduce the number of banks and increase its size, market power may increase and the
environment in which banks operate may become less competitive. Not all studies point in
this direction though. Taking into account potentially increasing competition from abroad
and from non-bank-institutions, the effects of concentration on competition could be partly
or wholly counteracted. If that is the case, banks may take more risks.13
A final trend to be considered is what is commonly pointed out as the µEOXUULQJ RI
GLVWLQFWLRQV¶ between various financial firms and sectors. This phenomenon concerns a
complex of more or less concurring developments, such as the selling of insurance policies
by banks, the innovation of unbundling and rebundling of financial products and the
emergence of conglomerates. From the viewpoint of supervision and financial stability,
financial conglomerates are the most important. To the extent that these institutions are
better able to diversify both earnings and risks, they contribute to the stability of the
financial system. On the other hand, these conglomerates may be very big in size, and
consequently, may increase the systemic ramifications when they run into trouble.
Incidentally, this trend has proceeded to different degrees in European countries.
Particularly in the Netherlands and the UK, conglomerates play a very important role in the
financial sector.
Summarising, the common element of the financial trends discussed is that the linkages
between financial markets and institutions, both across border and across sectors, are
intensifying. The resulting integration of financial markets makes the financial system more
resilient to local asymmetric disturbances, but may at the same time facilitate the
transmission of contagion risk.
,93UHYHQWLYHDUUDQJHPHQWVILQDQFLDOUHJXODWLRQ
,9,QIOXHQFHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ
In many respects, financial regulation has been adapted to the trends that are described in
section II of this report. In reaction to the internationalisation of the financial sector, several
international standard-setting bodies have been established, notably the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (1974), the International Organisation of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO; 1983) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS; 1994). In
order to promote the level playing field between financial institutions of different
nationalities and to avoid undesirable regulatory arbitrage as much as possible, these
international bodies have realised a significant harmonisation of financial regulation.
Nonetheless, there remains work to be done, by the above-mentioned fora, as well as by
organisations as the Financial Stability Forum and the International Monetary Fund.
Although the harmonisation of financial regulation within the EU is generally consistent
with the international standards as agreed by the above-mentioned international fora, it is14
often farther-reaching. European financial harmonisation is directed at achieving a single
market for financial services, in which banks, insurance undertakings and investment firms
authorised by one Member State are allowed to establish a branch or to provide cross-border
services into other Member States on the basis of supervision of those activities by the
‘home country’ supervisory authority. The single market policy is based on the mutual
recognition of national regulations of Member States, and therefore requires a considerable
degree of financial harmonisation. The advent of new (and probably less advanced) Member
States into the system could in this respect pose some important challenges. The harmonised
financial regulations encompass high standards of entrance to the market as well as detailed
ongoing prudential supervisory requirements, which are all embodied in directives. The
legally binding character of directives is another distinguishing feature of the harmonisation
of financial regulation within the EU. Progress towards adapting conduct of business and
consumer regulation to meet the needs of the Single Market is under way.
The European Commission is assisted in preparing directives in the field of banking,
insurance and securities supervision by respectively the Banking Advisory Committee
(BAC), the Insurance Committee (IC) and the High Level Securities Supervisors Committee
(HLSSC), in which the ministries of finance and the respective national supervisory
authorities and, in the case of the BAC, also the central banks are represented. The Financial
Services Policy Group (FSPG) helps the Commission to determine its priorities on a cross-
sector basis, and thereby indirectly influences the work of the BAC, the IC and the HLSSC.
The FSPG was established as part of the Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan,
which was introduced to improve the Single Market and was endorsed by the Cologne
Council on 2 and 3 June 1999. In the process of preparing directives, the EU Ministers of
Finance, represented in the Ecofin, negotiate and agree the directives in the field of banking
and securities. The EU Ministers of Finance are individually responsible – and thus
accountable vis-à-vis their national parliaments – for keeping European directives and
national regulations in line with each other.
The regulatory framework in Europe leaves some discretion to national authorities for
interpretation and translation into national legislation. This could potentially result in
regulatory arbitrage and an unlevel playing field. Different reporting requirements may for
example be regarded as a source of inefficiency for reporting institutions. However, this
does not necessarily mean that the stability of the European financial system is negatively15
affected by remaining differences in national financial regulation. On the contrary, these
differences can be judged positive from a viewpoint of financial stability, since national
authorities are best suited to take into account the specific characteristics of local markets
and individual financial institutions. Although the EU framework of prudential regulation
does not need a radical overhaul, there is a need for a more streamlined, flexible and faster
legislative approach to respond to the fast moving environment of financial integration and
to the new risks that may arise as a consequence.
,9,QIOXHQFHRIRWKHUWUHQGV
Financial regulation has also been adjusted to other relevant trends. For example,
WHFKQRORJLFDOLQQRYDWLRQ has motivated a number of new or adapted financial standards,
although a considerable time lag between the innovation and the adjustment of financial
regulation is often unavoidable. The proposals for new capital requirements for banks by the
Basel Committee and the European Commission are largely motivated to better address the
financial innovation that has occurred in recent years, as shown, for example, by asset
securitisation structures. The proposed new capital standards are also aimed at recognising
the improvements in risk measurement and control that have occurred. In this way, future
capital requirements should better reflect the true risk profile of banks.
Another important trend discussed in section II is the HPHUJHQFHRIILQDQFLDOFRQJORPHUDWHV.
In this respect, the work of the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates, which is
constituted under the aegis of the Basel Committee, the IOSCO and the IAIS, deserves
attention. Besides principles with regard to the exchange of information and co-operation
between supervisors, the Joint Forum has developed techniques and principles to facilitate
the assessment of capital adequacy on a group-wide basis and the judgement of the fitness
and properness of managers of financial conglomerates. In an European context, a mixed
technical group set-up under the BAC, the IC and the HLSSC is currently developing
prudential rules for financial conglomerates following the recommendations of the Joint
Forum. The proposals of this mixed technical group are expected by the end of this year,
which deserves approval given the importance of financial conglomerates in some areas of
the EU.
Adaptation to FRQFHQWUDWLRQDQGFRQVROLGDWLRQhas not been considered. As a general rule,
international standards agreed by the Basel Committee, IOSCO and IAIS, as well as the EU-16
directives do not make a distinction between large and small financial institutions. After all,
making a distinction between large and small financial institutions would conflict with the
principle of equality and would thereby hamper the level playing field.
93UHYHQWLYHDUUDQJHPHQWVVXSHUYLVLRQ
9%DVLFSULQFLSOHVRIFRRSHUDWLRQ
In light of the trends discussed in section II, extensive co-operation between different
authorities involved in the supervision of regulated institutions can be regarded as a key
condition for effective supervision. In this respect, there exists broad international consensus
that (1) there should not be any obstacles for co-operation and information sharing between
supervisors, both at the domestic and the international level; (2) the confidentiality of shared
information should be secured, and; (3) supervisors should take a proactive stance towards
co-operation, both as providers and requestors of assistance and information. As will be
explained below, these principles have been incorporated in the EU-directives.
Generally, the rather far-reaching provisions on co-operation between supervisors in EU-
regulation have been motivated by the introduction of the single market for financial
services. Although it is impractical to give an overview of all the detailed provisions on co-
operation between EU-supervisors in the relevant directives, the following elements appear
to be most important. Firstly, the relevant directives impose DQ REOLJDWLRQ for banking,
insurance and securities supervisors to co-operate and exchange information with their
counterparts in other Member-States in relation to institutions operating in their
jurisdictions. Secondly, the relevant directives create WKHSRVVLELOLW\ to exchange supervisory
information with other categories of supervisors in the same as well as in other Member
States. Finally, the so-called post-BCCI directive has enhanced the possibilities for the
exchange of information between supervisory and non-supervisory authorities within and
between Member States. On the basis of this directive confidential supervisory information
it is allowed to be passed to central banks and payment overseers for the purpose of the
performance of their tasks. These latter authorities may also provide relevant information to
supervisory authorities.
The co-operation between banking supervisors has an additional dimension, because of the
principle of supervision on a consolidated basis. Consolidated supervision essentially
implies that banking supervisors do not only take into account the risks to which a bank17
itself is exposed, but also the risks which other members of the same group incur and which
may affect the solvency of a bank. In practical terms, applying this principle to a banking
group means the aggregation of financial terms, after netting-out intra-group positions, of a
bank’s overall financial activities. These aggregated figures are the yardsticks for any
prudential requirements, such as solvency requirements and large exposure limits. The
application of the principle of consolidated supervision requires that the supervisor of the
country where a bank has its main establishment, must have insight in the risks of the bank
or banking group as a whole. In view of the internationalisation of the financial sector and
the emergence of financial conglomerates, it is important that this responsibility is clearly
assigned to one (or more) supervisor(s).
The Basel Committee has confirmed the principle of consolidated supervision most recently
in the Core Principles (1997). However, there exists no international agreement on the
necessity or adequacy of consolidated supervision in the other key segments of the financial
industry, namely securities and insurance. Within the EU, banking supervision on a
consolidated basis has been introduced simultaneously with the adoption of the
corresponding principle by the Basel Committee. A notable aspect of this so-called
Directive on the Supervision on a Consolidated Basis of Credit Institutions is that it
introduces not only the obligation for supervisors to exchange information on a cross-border
basis, but also the obligation to co-operate on a cross-sector basis, if any of the supervised
institutions fall within the scope of the Directive. Despite the above-mentioned lack of
international agreement, the principle of consolidated supervision also holds for securities
firms within the EU, and which is regulated in the Capital Adequacy Directive. Although
consolidated supervision is not required for insurance supervision in the EU, a recent
directive requires insurance supervisors in certain circumstances to take into account the
solvency of the group as a whole in assessing the solvency of individual insurance
undertakings (using the so-called solo-plus supervisory model).
Supervision on a consolidated basis can be regarded as a first, important step in the direction
of one (or more) lead supervisor(s), or co-ordinating supervisor(s), for large financial
institutions (see also the answers on a questionnaire, which are summarised in annex 1). The
Joint Forum published proposals for a co-ordinating supervisor in 1997. It functions purely
as a SULPXVLQWHUSDUHV. The possible elements of co-ordination, which supervisors can use18
to define the role of one (ore more) co-ordinating supervisor(s) in emergency and non-
emergency circumstances, can be summarised as follows:
-  The co-ordinator receives all relevant information from the supervisors involved and
provides key information to them in non-emergency situations.
-  Idem in emergency situations.
-  The co-ordinator makes group-wide assessments of key areas and communicates
potential problems to relevant supervisors.
-  Overlap in supervisory activities is avoided through bilateral discussions between
the co-ordinator and other supervisors.
These elements of co-ordination are far from mandatory, because the Joint Forum explicitly
acknowledges the fact that the role and responsibilities of the co-ordinator depend heavily
on the specific circumstances of financial institutions, such as the legal framework and the
risk profile of the institution involved. Nevertheless, the elements of co-ordination can be
regarded as very useful, and in many cases, even necessary conditions for adequate
communication and collaboration between different supervisors of the same financial
institution. So far, the EU-directives do not provide for one (or more) co-ordinating
supervisor(s).
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The co-operation between EU-supervisors in practice has several dimensions. An important
channel of co-operation is constituted by several consultative bodies, which provide a
multilateral forum for the exchange of information and co-operation between supervisors
from different Member States. For banking supervision, the Banking Supervision
Committee (BSC) of the ECB is mandated, by the Governing Council, to perform the
above-mentioned function, besides assisting the ESCB in contributing to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. A distinguishing
feature of the BSC is that both central banks and banking supervisors are represented, which
allows for an exchange of views between those authorities which are responsible for
safeguarding the stability of the financial system. Within another forum, the Groupe de
Contact, banking supervisors exchange views on individual institutions and market
developments, and assess trends in the banking sector. With regard to insurance supervision,
the consultative body is the ‘Conference of Insurance Supervisory Authorities of the19
Member States of the European Union’ (‘the Conference’), which also exchanges
information on individual cases. Although several consultative bodies exist within the EU
with respect to securities supervision (the Securities Contact Committee, the UCITS contact
committee, and FESCO, the Forum of European Securities Commissions), none of them is
involved in the exchange of confidential information on individual cases. Finally, the
chairmen of the supervisory committees of the different disciplines have started to meet and
are well placed to carry forward any work on inter-sectoral information exchange which
seems necessary.
In practice, banking supervisors within the EEA also cooperate bilaterally on the basis of so-
called Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), which serve to specify the co-operation
between supervisors as envisaged in the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive. At the
moment, a comprehensive suit of MOUs is in place, and bilateral MOU-meetings are
usually held on an annual basis. MOUs typically include practical provisions with regard to
the establishment of a branch, supervisory co-operation on an ongoing basis and co-
operation in the field of on-site inspections of, or visits to, branches. Whereas MOUs are
designed to facilitate supervisory co-operation with respect to branches, the agreement is
often extended by analogy and in informal terms to co-operation with regard to subsidiaries.
In addition, non-binding framework agreements exist with certain third countries, under
which bilateral co-operation agreements can be signed. The Commission has recently
concluded such an agreement with the US Federal Reserve and the OCC. MOUs with
Switzerland and Canada will follow soon.
In addition to these general MOUs, some MOUs for specific cross-border financial groups
have been signed, in particular between the French and the Belgian banking supervisors
with respect to the supervision of Dexia and between the four banking and insurance
supervisors of Belgium and the Netherlands with respect to the supervision of Fortis. The
main motivation for these specific MOUs is to provide clarity on the supervisor(s)
responsible for co-ordinated supervision or group-wide supervision. In the specific case of
the merger of MeritaNordbanken and Unidanmark, the conglomerate is to be supervised by
authorities in four countries, which may give rise to the need for multilateral MOUs.
Many European securities supervisors have also signed bilateral MOUs for the exchange of
information with other Member States. The EU-insurance supervisors have, under the aegis20
of the above-mentioned ‘Conference’, agreed on a detailed set of rules and procedures with
regard to information exchange and co-operation in the form of so-called protocols. These
protocols constitute a multilateral memorandum of understanding between insurance
supervisors on how proceed in a common manner towards the effective supervision of
insurance undertakings that operate under the EU-directives. In this way, the protocols
obviate the need to enter into bilateral MOUs for insurance supervisors. There may be a
need to ensure that the memoranda and protocols are sufficiently uniform in content and that
they are reviewed regularly.
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Despite the preventive arrangements discussed in the last section, financial difficulties at
individual firms, resulting for example from external disturbances, can not be ruled out. In
such a situation both the supervisory authorities and other authorities, in particular the
central bank, can deploy different instruments to avoid potentially disruptive effects on the
financial system as a whole. In the early stages of financial problems at individual
institutions, supervisors can take a variety of measures ranging from a re-assessment of the
financial situation of the institution involved to the appointment of special auditors.
However, if these supervisory actions do not have the desired effect in time, and the
difficulties at one institution potentially threaten the confidence in the financial system as a
whole, different crisis management instruments can be deployed.
An important crisis management instrument is orchestrating or at least encouraging a purely
private sector solution, such as organising take-overs or facilitating liquidity support by the
private sector by providing information. The supervisory authority will provide information
about the troubled institution and about possible candidates to support this institution,
whereas the central bank may have to provide a transitional financing arrangement. In these
circumstances, there are advantages when central banks are formally responsible or
otherwise closely involved in banking supervision, since this shortens the lines of
communication as much as possible. Furthermore, central banks may provide liquidity to
the market as a whole. Also, central banks may provide liquidity support to individual
institutions, whereas the government might intervene when the solvency of the troubled
financial institution is lacking.21
It is well known that the availability of financial support for individual institutions, just like
any insurance, creates moral hazard, in the sense that it may induce financial institutions to
take additional risks. In principle, where liquidity support can be clearly separated from the
provision of risk capital, the moral hazard created will be limited to possible
mismanagement of liquidity risk. Capital support however, may raise expectations that the
financial institution is insured against the mismanagement of virtually all types of risk. It
should be noted, however, that the scope for providing risk capital support by governments
is very limited in a European context, since the European Commission is directly involved
in scrutinising whether the state aid is compatible with Community’s competition
legislation.
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The use of crisis management tools has been influenced by the LQWURGXFWLRQRIWKHHXUR. The
euro-countries have agreed on mechanisms for providing liquidity assistance to individual
institutions. An important principle of this agreement is that the responsibility for granting
liquidity support to individual institutions remains primarily at the national level, with the
national central banks concerned. Accordingly, all the costs and the risks relating to the
support operations are to be borne at the national level. Mechanisms have been devised in
order to ensure that: (1) any potential liquidity impact can be managed in a way that is
consistent with the maintenance of the appropriate monetary policy stance in the euro area;
and (2) cross-border implications can be dealt with by the competent authorities. This means
that an adequate flow of information has to be conveyed to the decision-making bodies of
the ESCB in due time, especially when the amount of central bank liquidity is large enough
to have a bearing on the implementation of monetary policy.
In view of the LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ of the financial sector, the question arises on how
supervisory authorities handle a situation in which an internationally operating financial
institution runs into difficulties. Depending on the crisis management instrument that is
considered to be most effective under the specific circumstances, it may be expected that
either the central bank, the supervisory authority, the Deposit Insurance Fund or, in extreme
cases the ministry of finance of the home country of the parent of the group, will take the
lead management in rescue operations. Obviously, this does not mean that the home country
will automatically bear all the risks or the costs of rescue operations. If a supervisory action,
such the requirement to restrict business or a private sector solution, is judged to be22
sufficient to avoid widespread financial instability, then the home supervisor of the legal
entity that is the parent of the group will be the natural lead manager of these actions. When
the use of one of the other crisis management instruments mentioned is needed, the central
bank of the home country of the troubled institution may normally perform the task of co-
ordinating the policies of the different authorities involved.
Incidentally, the use of crisis management instruments has traditionally been confined to
banks, because they are the most relevant from the viewpoint of financial stability. As a
result of the phenomenon of ILQDQFLDOFRQJORPHUDWLRQ between different types of financial
institutions, the question arises whether the limitation of the application of crisis
management tools to banks is still justified. Where the range of banks’ activities extends
beyond banking, it is difficult or impossible in practice to confine crisis management tools
to banking activities alone. In addition, as other types of financial intermediaries are
involved in banking activities, or in activities that are comparable to banking, their failure
might potentially have systemic consequences as well. Even more important is the case of
contagion from within a big financial conglomerate. As a general rule, central banks will not
provide liquidity assistance to non-bank financial institutions, but try to orchestrate private
sector support if that might help to avoid systemic disruption. The policy of the US Federal
Reserve in response to the LTCM-crisis is a case in point here.
Finally, several instruments are used when a troubled financial institution is not rescued, and
thus goes bankrupt, namely deposit guarantee systems and winding-up procedures. Within
Europe, the Deposit Guarantee Directive has introduced the principle of home country
control for national deposit protection schemes, which implies that funds deposited at
foreign branches of banks are covered by the deposit guarantee system of the home country
of the firm concerned. The Deposit Guarantee System sets minimum standards for deposit
protection. It is notable that winding-up procedures have not been harmonised within the
EU, although there has been a proposal on the table for a directive on this matter since 1988.
Consequently, there exists no clarity on the division of responsibilities between home and
host supervisors in the case of the winding-up of an internationally operating financial
institution. Practical arrangements to break the political deadlock on these proposals are
underway. Every effort should be made towards rapid adoption by the Council and the
European Parliament of the proposals which are a vital component of legal clarity and
financial stability in this area.23
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